AP Microeconomics · Past multiple choice · Question 19, older AP Economics course description · Four-function calculator

Strategy choices for Bright and Sparkle

A payoff matrix gives profits for two oligopoly firms. Work out each firm's dominant strategy.

The lesson this question tests

1 Read the question

The question is College Board's: sample question 19 in AP Economics Course Description. It starts on page 21 of the PDF. College Board no longer posts this edition, so it opens from the copy the Internet Archive saved on June 3, 2016. A four-function calculator is allowed, as on the exam.

Open Question 19 (PDF, page 21)

2 Pick your answer

3 Check the explanation

Why the answer is E open once you have picked

A dominant strategy is best for a player no matter what the other does. Check each firm separately.

Bright is the first number. If Sparkle plays Strategy 1, Bright earns $3,000 with Strategy 1 and $500 with Strategy 2, so Strategy 1 is better. If Sparkle plays Strategy 2, Bright earns $2,000 with Strategy 1 and $2,500 with Strategy 2, so Strategy 2 is better. Bright's best choice depends on Sparkle, so Bright has no dominant strategy.

Sparkle is the second number. If Bright plays Strategy 1, Sparkle earns $6,000 with Strategy 1 and $4,000 with Strategy 2. If Bright plays Strategy 2, Sparkle earns $3,000 with Strategy 1 and $0 with Strategy 2. Strategy 1 wins either way, so it is Sparkle's dominant strategy.

Each choice

  • A. Sparkle's half is right. Bright does best with Strategy 1 only when Sparkle plays Strategy 1; when Sparkle plays Strategy 2, Bright does better with Strategy 2.
  • B. Bright's Strategy 1 holds the largest payoff Bright can get, $3,000, but a dominant strategy has to win against each of Sparkle's moves, and it loses when Sparkle plays Strategy 2. Strategy 2 pays Sparkle less in both rows, $4,000 against $6,000 and $0 against $3,000. Choosing it means looking for the move that holds down Bright's profit instead of the one that raises Sparkle's own.
  • C. Strategy 2 is better for Bright only when Sparkle plays Strategy 2. A dominant strategy has to win against every choice the other firm makes.
  • D. This swaps the roles of the two firms. It is Bright whose best move depends on the other firm, so Bright has no dominant strategy, and Sparkle whose Strategy 1 pays more in both rows. A student who finds that one firm lacks a dominant strategy but attaches that finding to the wrong firm, then gives Bright its better reply to Sparkle's Strategy 2, lands here.
  • E (correct). Bright's best choice switches with Sparkle's move, while Sparkle does better with Strategy 1 whatever Bright does.

Question and answer key: College Board, from the Internet Archive. The title and summary are ours, and so is the explanation.